Introduction
In October 2011, the European Commission proposed the introduction of an optional European contract law to improve the functioning of the internal market.
1 Upon adoption, the Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) would become available to parties involved in cross-border sale transactions within the European Economic Area (EEA).
2 By removing the current barriers, the objective of the instrument is to encourage European Union (EU) trade for both consumers and businesses, more specifically the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) .3 Nevertheless, the future of this new legal regime strongly depends on its utility to the parties concerned due to its voluntary optin nature. In other terms, the CESL will only succeed in eliminating the trade barriers as long as companies actually make use of this alternative legal system. 4 This ambitious proposal shares many components with the well-established United Nations Convention on the Sale of Goods (CISG) adopted in 1980. Drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL), the Convention established a default legal regime for international commercial sale contracts. 5 Similarly to the purpose of the CESL, UNCITRAL wished to bring about legal certainty and reduction of transaction costs. 
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wished to include definitions whereas the CISG does not. Even though the legal certainty might be higher in the CESL due to its detailed drafting, the CISG might offer a better trade instrument to work with. As a matter of fact, businesses need to transform those provisions into standard contracts. Moreover, the opponents of the CESL refute that length adds to legal certainty and defend that it leads to even more confusion. 28 The CESL is more thorough but this might have negative consequences if its intended use is 'simple' contracts. 29 Nonetheless, the CESL already provides the businesses with workable documents in the annexes. 
Legal relationship
Before the publication of the Commission's proposal, the German professor Magnus had envisaged various options as to the legal relationship that would exist between the CISG and a European Contract law. 31 His third example referred to hypothetical optional rules, which would enjoy a lower status than the CISG due to their non-binding nature. 32 Later, the Commission has found a balance by adopting rules only binding upon the parties wishing to be bound by them. 33 Unfortunately, the scope chosen makes it difficult to identify a hierarchical order based on the lex specialis reasoning between the CESL and the CISG as the one already existing between the international instrument and the national systems, according to which the CISG takes precedence because of its specialisation. 34 In the EU Member States, the CISG prevails over national rules of contract law. 35 In that sense, both instruments function as 'a second national regime'. 36 In practice, opting into CESL amounts to a choice within national law falling under Rome I rather than a choice for a national law. 37 Since the two instruments might conflict with each other, the relationship between the two instruments must be clear.
According to the recital 25 of the CESL, a choice for CESL automatically excludes the application of the CISG because it implies the will of the parties to opt-out. Contrarily,
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is taken. 43 In addition, a business situated in a non-contracting state or businesses in contracting states opting out of the CISG will fall back on the same instrument if they opt for the national law of a country that is a contracting state to the Convention. 44 Interestingly, not only can private parties deviate from the CISG but such exclusion is also allowed for the contracting states themselves. Two or more states may also opt out of the international agreement for the contract of sales of goods concluded among business from those states under Art. 94 CISG. This exclusion is possible if they have 'the same or closely related legal rules on matters governed by this Convention'. The Scandinavian countries have already made use of this option such as to apply their already very similar sales law to those contracts. 45 Finally, the CISG also knows an opt-in function for those countries that have not ratified the Convention. In the European Union, companies carrying out business from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal and Malta can opt into the Convention under Art. 1(1)(b) CISG. 
Proposal for a Common European Sales Law
According to Art. 3 CESL, the Common European Sales Law will only be applicable if the parties validly agree to opt into the instrument. 47 In practical terms, the parties will have to opt into the instrument requiring positive action; otherwise it will not apply to their transactions. According to recital 24, the Commission strongly encourages the parties to opt for the whole document when choosing for the European instrument. There is also a possibility to rely on the CESL outside of its formal scope if the provisions are put into standard contract terms if they are compatible with the national provisions. 48 The European 68 The decision to carry out business abroad is one of the goals to be decided upon within the company since this is part of its 'strategy'. 69 The tendency to think in terms of international strategies and solutions seem however more common amongst large firms. 70 Generally, when businesses have the impression that they are Unfortunately, the assumption that differences in the contracting legal systems of the Union discourage cross-border trade is not always supported by reliable empirical evidence.
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The Commission has attempted to gather statistical data evaluating to which extent legal barriers prevent businesses from trading abroad. 76 However, criticism exists towards the Eurobarometer surveys carried out, on the grounds of the inadequate sample of interviewees and the framing of the questions intended to obtain specific answers. For example, this survey was limited to companies already trading in a cross-border failing to include those not yet abroad. 77 An example of the subjectivity related to the interpretation of data can also be found. In its proposal, the Commission states from the start that differences in contract law deter traders from conducting business abroad. 78 The survey instead reveals contradictory numbers with only 3% of businesses being always deterred to trade cross-71 G. Low 2012, p.528-529. 72 UEAPME 2012a, p.1. It is undeniable that a common European law will make trade easier but the degree of improvement is debatable. 101 Therefore businesses will have to calculate the 'efficiency and distributive effects of CESL' to determine the costs of implementing the instrument compared to the benefits it would bring. 102 In the end, those implementation costs might be lower than the benefits encouraging the company to make use of it. 103 Yet an increase of costs will be caused by the need for companies to learn about a new set of laws and to include it in the negotiations even if they do not choose it.
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If the company is already trading abroad, the study of the new instrument will amount to the same costs as those of looking to invest in a new state except that in this case it has only not to be done once. For companies that would like to start trading abroad, they will be able to spend money investigating one legal system instead of 28 in order to cover the same territory. 105 This is however based on the assumption that businesses intend on trading on a European-wide scale and that legal diversity exists despite the CISG. This brings this section to a final remark. When it comes to international trade law, economics experts must also be included in the discussion instead of leaving it to the lawyers and legal academics to 
Ratification by the states
From a political point of view, the CISG was faced which much less opposition from the nationalists than the CESL is. It gathered as many as 18 ratifications less than ten years after its adoption. the CISG is more neglected than resisted'. 
Use by businesses
The views evaluating the use of the CISG by the businesses differ. On the one hand, it is argued that the CISG is only opted out by parties assisted by legal advisers. 119 The 1993 Report of the Scottish Law Commission on the Formation of Contracts presented a position in favour of the CISG to the government and mentioned that 'these rules now apply very widely in international trade'. 120 Recent data also support the idea that large businesses have stopped derogating from the CISG automatically. 121 On the other hand, authors put forward the low rate of use of the Convention as a factor to take into account for the other words, it could well be that the companies are actually relying on the CISG whereas they believe it is national law, since it has been recognised as part of the national system due to its automatic application.
In general, the opt-out rate seems to vary depending on the jurisdiction. In fact, even though there is no general attitude towards opting out, this is the case in some jurisdictions. 128 Moreover, instead of a case-by-case approach, it appears that the decision to opt-out is more of a general policy decision. Reasons for opting out of the CISG are the lack of knowledge with regard to the Convention, the 'significant learning costs', the bargaining strength, the content and the lack of a court of last instance at the international level. The existence of the CISG makes the need for uniformity less urgent although it is worth considering a European initiative. 148 Currently, cross-border commercial contracts within the European Union are subject to the Rome I Regulation. According to this Regulation, any legal system may be chosen to apply to the contract including a non-European legal system.
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On top of the existing CISG and the various national systems, 'CESL ''simply'' adds one more choice to the many that businesses already have'. 150 The ICC also believes that it will be difficult to be more beneficial than the CISG and it will result into a lesser understanding of the legal situation. 151 Those assets are however necessary because businesses will only opt into the CESL if it brings an 'added value' to the default contract law of 24 Member States.
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If the CESL proposal is adopted as it stands now, the legal environment will look as follows.
Companies will need to rely on national law for domestic transactions, they will have the option to choose for the CESL for European transactions and for transactions involving businesses outside of the EU the already established CISG will apply.
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Considering the preference of companies for lesser costs, be it time or money, one may conclude that this will make the legal environment even more complex and will increase the costs for the companies. However, each type of company may have different aspirations and developed its structure in accordance to them. 154 In that case, companies thinking locally with a few employees only face national law, those with a European ambition can apply the CESL to their cross-border trade and for the most daring ones the CISG remains available for international trade, including most of the trade conducted within the European Union. In short, it may be that each layer will correspond to a type of likely minded company. 155 In its recent proposal to further the efforts of the CISG which will be presented in the next section, Switzerland commented that regional harmonisation of laws does not benefit international trade but renders it even more difficult. 156 The Council also expresses its concerns about the increasing complexity of the pre-contractual phase if the contracting parties were to choose between a global sales law and a regional sales law on top of their national laws. It further argues that 'a key attribute of uniformity and harmonisation is also simplicity', which is here threatened by regional endeavours.
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First, the plurality of legal instruments will result into fragmentation contrary to the aim. 158 Second, regional harmonisation will add another layer to the existing legal systems.
Third, those harmonising efforts use a different wording than the CISG. 159 Fourth, they might also introduce new legal solutions. All those elements will create a more complicated legal environment leading to higher costs, which will in turn fail in increasing the amount of cross-border transactions. In addition, the more regional initiatives, the lesser case law dealing with the CISG at the international level, this will affect the development of case law ensuring the predictability of the interpretation of the Convention. 160 Overall, this will discourage countries from acceding to the Convention.
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In short, Switzerland believes that 'regional endeavours to harmonize and unify general contract law cannot meet the needs of international trade.' Likewise, the Council harshly puts in doubt the ability of other attempts to reach solutions as good as those of the CISG.
Nevertheless, it recognises the enriching contribution of the regional initiatives including the developments it leads to in the field of comparative law. very static way to predict the outcome of the tumultuous interaction between the CISG and the CESL. To the contrary, those instruments are the result of a naturally evolving process and they share the same values and purpose. Indeed, the European Union was not the first institution to realise the importance and the possible advantages of harmonisation in the field of international trade law and hopefully, they will not be the last ones either.
Rather than enemies, the two instruments can better be compared to siblings. The CISG precedes the CESL from a chronological perspective. And even though there might be some competition, the younger instrument looked up to the older one for inspiration. Reciprocally, the experienced instrument might also have tricks to learn from the more innovative CESL.
Aims and values
On a superficial level, the goals of both instruments can be distinguished. On the one hand, the CISG intends to replace national law in cross-border sales transaction, i. 
Stakeholders
The Commission has held a public consultation in 2010 on the policy options to further
European contract law and the expert group on the Proposal for a Common European
Sales Law has met with stakeholders such as the ICC. 200 Regardless the possible criticisms as to the interpretation of those opinions given by stakeholders, the United Nations can draw on this experience to consult more widely with various stakeholders, including the companies and not only their representatives. Again, if the goal is to fix a problem, it is crucial to understand precisely which issues the businesses are facing.
In order to ensure the best future for European Sales Law, the collection of data on the reliance on the CISG itself may be quite helpful. 201 Indeed, a conclusive survey indicating how many businesses, classified by size categories, make use of the Convention in each country would be a significant contribution. The questions should not stop at this descriptive aspect but they should also ask for the reasons why businesses do or do not opt out of the Convention. 202 Finally, a careful drafting of the questions as well as an unbiased selection of participants is necessary. Admittedly, similar surveys have been carried out but an up-to-date collection of data focusing only on this topic would contribute to predict the future of the CESL and would also improve its chances of success.
Content
The CISG has influenced the drafting of the DCFR and the PECL on which the CESL is based. 203 Yet, even though the provisions are heavily borrowed from the Convention, the wording differs. Stakeholders such as the UEAPME argue for maintaining the wording of The structure of the document, its length and the detail of its content makes the CISG user-friendly and it allows for flexibility. 207 For those reasons, the CESL should take it as a model. 208 On the other hand, some argue that since the CISG excludes consumers and the CESL aims at protecting consumers in B2C transactions, the former cannot be taken as an example for the latter. 209 Nonetheless, the Directive on Consumer Sales of 1999 already took over provisions from the CISG despite their divergent scopes therefore borrowing can still be envisaged especially in the commercial context.
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The most recent CESL also brings three novelties to the old understanding of international trade law: consumer law, standardised contracts and digital transactions. 211 Indeed, the CESL took into account that the consumer is actually the main actor when it comes to international transactions. 212 In 1980, it was assumed that the key actors able to buy and sell abroad were (large) firms. Nowadays, the invention of Internet changed the meaning of international trade itself. It further deals with standard contracts in a few instances while this is left unregulated by the CISG. Lastly, the CESL incorporates the fact that contracts are concluded over the Internet and that the good itself might also consist of digital content. 213 In short, this makes the CESL an instrument more in line with the modern times. On the other hand, the compromise sometimes resulted in an inefficient solution such as illustrated by the conflicting agreement found concerning the writing requirements under Art. 11 and Art. 12 CISG. 221 The failure to find a political compromise sometimes resulted in gaps in the CISG, such as it was the case with specific performance, and the European initiative should avoid this during the future negotiations. 
Promotion of the instrument
Due to its opt-in nature, CESL will depend on its promotion among the stakeholders whereas the CISG is to some extent 'imposed' on uninformed businesses. It must also be kept in mind that the economic crisis might no place the information campaign of 232 UEAPME 2012c, p.2.
233 Webster 22-10-2012, p.1.
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Uniform interpretation
The enforcement means to ensure the application of the CESL provisions appears as a factor in advising the clients to rely on the instrument. 234 Under the CISG, the judicial protection on which the parties can rely to enforce a contract is left to the national courts subjected to a duty of uniform interpretation. 235 Therefore, an enforcement mechanism exists but in as much as uniform laws are necessary, uniform interpretation is crucial for harmonisation. This reasoning is best illustrated by the following quote: 'the uniform law from the very moment of its coming into operation starts to differ from itself. Every judge in every country is a sovereign interpreter of the text, and the judge became a judge by learning the system of law of his own country'. 236 For this purpose, UNCITRAL created a Digest on the CISG as well as CLOUT, a database containing case law based on the texts of UNCITRAL. 237 The CISG has also installed the CISG Advisory Council for further guidance as to the interpretation and the application of the Convention. The European Law Institute (ELI) suggests the CESL to do the same in order to improve implementation.
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Luckily, in the case of a European instrument, the CJEU could step in to give a uniform interpretation throughout the European Union. 239 However, the backlog of cases at the CJEU pushing back the delay before judgment to more than 16 months in 2010 and longer than two years for the General Court is an issue for businesses that favour efficiency and certainty. 240 Moreover, national delays must be added to the length of preliminary ruling procedure which reached 13 years in the most extreme case. 241 However, a database could actually defeat those practical obstacles and it could also influence arbitration courts, which might be preferred by business parties. 242 In fact, such reporting system has even revealed that differences are not so great in practice in the case of the CISG. 
New initiatives
On top of improving the internal market, the CESL has the potential to have an impact of international sales law by encouraging 'updates' of the current Conventions or at least by introducing new practices and doctrine.
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In May 2012, Switzerland submitted a proposal on 'possible future work by UNCITRAL in the area of international contract law'. 250 Its proposition is two-fold. First, it wants to consider the current and future needs of businesses and evaluate the ability of the CISG and related instruments to address them. Second, it wants to analyse whether further harmonisation could and should be achieved based on the observations in the first step. 251 It implies in its argumentation that an international convention should include 'the full array of legal issues that arise in a contractual business to business relationship'. 252 Switzerland wished to add to the CISG but it also warns that it should not go as far as to regulate domestic contracts.
253 244 Reding 17-12-2012, p.3; JURI February 2013 , p.8. 245 Heidemann 2012 , p. 1129 Kornet 2012, p.13 
The Convention on the International Sale of Goods
In the future, more states will probably ratify the Convention improving its status as a global law even further. 257 Yet its content will also play a key role, hence, some authors have already voiced their will for 'general principles of contract law for the world trade' or even a global code relying on the existing uniform laws has been envisaged. 258 The CISG Advisory Council 
The Proposal for a Common European Sales Law
The CESL will not replace the existing acquis since it is limited to cross-border transactions even though it might contribute to its development. In other words, harmonisation as such will have to be pursued from the very beginning if this is the intention of the Commission, the Member States and the European Parliament. 265 Overall, the European Union method seems easier to modify because it does not follow the international in-or-out approach but rather the majority voting or even the possibility for a delegating act for non-essential elements. This is supported by a previous attempt of the United Nations to modernise The pitfall of adopting a uniform trade law in the form of a treaty is the right to make reservations. This occurs when states declare unilaterally that they wish to exclude provisions from the treaty, leading to a limited application of the agreement since those provisions will not have binding effects upon them. 269 It is however possible to prohibit reservations in the treaties but this is likely to result in fewer signatories because it removes the margin for compromise. In addition, the treaty itself may allow for accession to parts of the treaty only such as it is the case with the Convention. 270 However, an optional instrument containing both default and mandatory rules open the door for individuals' reservations, distorting uniformity as well. The advantage of the treaty form is that once the country has given its consent, it is binding upon the entire territory whereas an optional instrument might affect only one individual in the whole territory. 
The legal and political consequences of a choice between the two instruments
The scholars opposing the adoption of CESL defend that the adoption of the instrument itself will defeat it when CESL fails to be opted in. This is caused by the fact that the CISG will still apply to a consumer transaction if the seller did not know or could not have known that it was not a commercial transaction.
In addition, the CISG opts for a narrow interpretation of the term 'consumer' whereas previous EU law such as the Consumer Directive prefers a broader interpretation. Kingdom must opt into the Convention. As an addition however, the European proposal includes several aspects of contract law not dealt with under the CISG. In practice, European businesses will have to opt out of the Convention and opt into the CESL which makes the success of the European instrument heavily dependent on its attraction to businesses. By focusing on the nature of small and medium-sized enterprises, the CESL meets the needs of the greater amount of businesses. However, this structure itself is not the best fit for 289 Hondius 2007, p.112; Sandvik 2012 , p.1097 -1098 . 290 Sandvik 2012 , p. 1098 291 See UEAPME 2012b, p.3; UEAPME 2013, p. 
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international trade and SMEs rarely display 'pan-European' aspirations. Moreover, the data supporting the need for a European instrument appears not to be entirely reliable. For this reason, a better collaboration between the various fields involved will improve the chances of success of the CESL by defining the problem accurately. Indeed, the importance of contract law for the functioning of companies should not be overestimated either.
The CISG has gathered an impressive amount of ratifications and it influenced development of both national and international laws. Yet the reliance of businesses on the instrument shows a mitigated success and additional data may be required to understand the situation in order to apply it to the case of the CESL. If the businesses prefer avoiding the CISG, this can be linked to objective opposition against the instrument itself or it can also mean that optional instruments do not bring sufficient benefits in general. In the latter case, the CESL will face an even bigger obstacle since it will require the businesses to be informed about the legal situation and consequently they will need to take positive actions.
Yet, due to the difficulty of the United Nations to modernise an instrument adopted more than thirty years ago, a European instrument in the field of contract seems to be the most appropriate level to achieve the same objectives. Later on, it has potential to contribute to further international uniformity in collaboration with other regional initiatives. Moreover, it will only complicate the legal environment from a legal perspective.
As far as businesses are concerned, the introduction of a European instrument will provide them with an instrument fitted for European ambitions. International businesses can pursue the use of the Convention for almost all their transactions and locally minded firms will not suffer from further interference.
In conclusion, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods diminishes the chances of success of the CESL because of its scope and its experience in the short term.
Nevertheless, the CESL has enhanced its likelihood to be relied upon in commercial transactions by implementing the teachings of the CISG and thanks to its more innovative thinking. In the long run, the gap between the needs of the society and the 1980 CISG will continue to grow whereas the modern European Sales Law is best suited for future modifications. Finally, businesses will probably appreciate the convenience of relying on one document regardless of the type of buyer they are selling to. 
